2024 Insider Threat Report: Key Risks and Cybersecurity Insights

Top Insider Threat Risks in 2024 and Beyond

Insider Threat Risks: The Betrayal Within

Picture 2024 as a year where the city’s own turned against it—nearly 40% of break-ins came from inside jobs, a silent stab in the back. The crooks didn’t just stumble in; they recruited employees, flipping legit workers into double agents with access to the keys—systems, data, secrets. These 2024 insider threats could be considered as turncoats who know the locks, dodging security like pros, their moves too slick for regular alarms to catch. Some had VIP passes—privileged accounts—that handed attackers the reins to critical systems, sparking breaches, blackouts, and big losses. They dug in deep, planting backdoors to leak data slow and steady or keep the door ajar for outsiders, all while blending in like ghosts.

These insiders weren’t just lone wolves—they greased the wheels for bigger hits, slipping creds, dropping malware, or guiding hackers sideways through the network. Armed with insider know-how, they spun social engineering traps—phishing emails so real their coworkers clicked without a blink. Spotting them? A nightmare—their dirty work looked like Tuesday’s to-do list, needing fancy analytics to sniff out the weird. Cash was the lure—financial bribes or fraud gigs turned loyalty into a paycheck. In the cloud, they got crafty, tweaking policies or building secret hideouts for later chaos. The fix? Lock down the whole identity game—because when trust turns toxic, it’s a slow bleed that’s tough to stop.

Nearly 40% of interactive intrusions involved insider threat operations in 2024.
A key recommendation in the 2024 insider threats report is to secure the entire identity ecosystem, as adversaries increasingly target identities using credential theft, MFA bypass, and social engineering, moving laterally across environments via trusted relationships, potentially including insiders.
Insider Threat Amplification: When threat actors recruit existing employees, they turn legitimate insiders into malicious ones, leveraging their authorized access to systems, data, and sensitive information for more damaging, harder-to-detect attacks.
Bypassing Security Controls: Recruited insiders use their deep understanding of security controls, policies, and procedures to bypass or circumvent defenses, making their actions difficult to spot with traditional monitoring tools.
Privilege Abuse: Insiders with privileged access are prime recruitment targets, granting threat actors extensive control over critical infrastructure, potentially leading to severe data breaches, system outages, and financial losses.
Long-Term Persistence: Recruited insiders can establish persistent access, maintaining backdoors, exfiltrating data over time, or providing ongoing entry to external actors without raising suspicion due to their legitimate presence.
Facilitating Further Attacks: Recruited insiders enable other attack vectors by providing credentials, installing malware, aiding lateral movement, or assisting data exfiltration, amplifying external threats.
Social Engineering Expertise: Insiders leverage internal knowledge and relationships to craft convincing social engineering attacks (e.g., phishing) against colleagues, boosting success rates.
Difficulty in Detection: Malicious insider activity blends with normal work, requiring sophisticated behavioral analytics to spot anomalies based on typical user behavior.
Financial Motivation: Financial gain often drives insiders to collaborate with threat actors, through direct payments or fraudulent schemes.
Cloud Environment Risks: Insiders with cloud access can deploy backdoors, tamper with identity or network policies, or create resources for later malicious use.

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: The Crumbling Walls

The city’s defenses were a patchwork mess in 2024, and attackers smelled blood. Folks clicking dodgy links, cracking open mystery files, or slacking on passwords handed crooks the front-door key. Unpatched software and sloppy setups in partner networks were like rusty gates begging to be kicked in. Edge devices—firewalls, VPNs—took a beating, with over 84,000 attack alerts since January, targeting big names like Cisco and Ivanti; 60% of those weak spots were fresh as identified in our 2024 insider threat report, the rest lingering from 2023. These internet-facing gadgets were goldmines, hit by mass exploits—think Moveit, CitrixBleed, Ivanti ConnectSecure—turning them into wide-open backdoors.

Zero-days tore through edge tech, while compromised devices got hijacked for deeper raids. Attackers moved fast—two days after a vuln went public, they’d strike, with 23% of break-ins sparked by public-facing apps, up 3% thanks to over 2,000 critical bugs. The juiciest flaws? Remote, no-login, easy-pickings—perfect for a quick smash. Network appliances topped the severity charts, and half of endpoint messes tied back to CVE-2023-23397, a phishing-friendly Outlook flaw. Old Windows servers, long past their expiration, fueled half the server breaches—relics too stubborn to die, too weak to fight. The walls were crumbling, and the bad guys knew every crack.

Users taking risks—such as clicking suspicious links, opening unknown attachments, or using weak passwords—face increasing threats.
Unpatched software, misconfigured systems, and known weaknesses in widely used technologies were frequently targeted in partner networks.
A sharp increase in attempted attacks on edge devices occurred since January 2024, with over 84,000 recorded alerts targeting vulnerabilities in brands like Cisco, SonicWall, Palo Alto, Citrix, Check Point, and Ivanti; approximately 60% of these vulnerabilities were from 2024, with the rest mainly from 2023.
Edge devices like firewalls and SSL VPN appliances remained high-value targets for attackers.
Mass exploitation of edge software—such as Moveit, CitrixBleed, Cisco XE, Fortiguard’s FortiOS, and Ivanti ConnectSecure—was observed, as these internet-exposed services are attractive entry points.
Many widely exploited vulnerabilities in 2024 involved zero-day attacks targeting network edge technologies.
Compromised edge devices can provide corporate network backdoor access.
Corporate edge devices increasingly faced zero-day exploitation in 2024 for broader network penetration; high-severity vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS GlobalProtect allowed remote code execution and multifactor bypass.
Attackers exploit vulnerabilities within just two days after a working example is made public, moving at unprecedented speeds.
23% of active intrusions were initiated via exploitation of public-facing applications, a 3% increase from the previous year, likely fueled by over 2,000 critical vulnerabilities identified.
Critical vulnerabilities that are remotely exploitable, require no privileges or user interaction, and have low complexity are attractive to attackers.
The most severe vulnerabilities tracked in 2024 were in internet-facing network appliances, primarily firewalls and VPN appliances.
Half of endpoint incidents in 2024 were attributed to CVE-2023-23397, a Microsoft Outlook elevation of privilege vulnerability exploited through phishing emails.
Exploitation of old and exposed vulnerabilities in external-facing assets was observed, with half of server incidents involving Microsoft Windows servers beyond their end of life.

Third-Party Risks: The Trojan Partners

Trust turned into a trap in 2024. IABs sniffed out third-party providers like wolves, cashing in on access to hit downstream partners—interconnected systems made it a prime hunting ground. Compromised edge devices flipped into launchpads, blasting attacks across vendors and supply chains. These partners, often seen as weaker links with VIP privileges, were juicy targets—hack one, hurt many. Keeping an eye on third- and fourth-party risks was the only way to spot the rot, blending your security with theirs into one shaky shield. Supply chain attacks sealed the deal—nailing a trusted vendor opened doors to a dozen more, a domino effect of doom. The city’s allies were its Achilles’ heel, and the bad guys played it like a fiddle.

Initial Access Brokers (IABs) may increasingly seek to monetize access to third-party service providers, enabling threat actors to compromise downstream operating partners and organizations reliant on interconnected systems.
Compromised edge devices may serve as a launching point for attacks on partners and vendors, creating supply chain risks.
Organizations increasingly rely on interconnected systems, making them prime targets for IABs, partly due to weaker security perceptions in third-party providers and their elevated privileges.
Continuously monitoring third- and fourth-party risk enables visibility into security issues and allows collaboration on remediation, as an organization’s security posture combines its own with its vendors’ and their vendors’ security.
Supply Chain Attacks: Compromising a trusted third-party vendor or supplier can provide attackers access to numerous downstream organizations via established trust relationships.

Zero-Day Exploits: The Invisible Blades

The shadows slashed deep in 2024 with zero-days—secret flaws that hit before anyone could blink. Over a dozen edge-device bugs popped up, scoring CVSS 8 or higher, and both nation-state spies and ransomware crews wielded them like daggers on Ivanti and Palo Alto PAN-OS. Patching? A pipe dream—these gadgets were too vital to shut down, leaving gaping holes. September saw an unknown crook chain CVE-2024-21287 with a known flaw (CVE-2024-20953), slicing through defenses. The periphery—network appliances—stayed a hot target, with attackers racing to weaponize public PoCs faster than ever.

China-nexus crews stockpiled vulns like ammo, while Trend Micro caught Void Banshee jabbing Windows with CVE-2024-38112. Water Hydra stung traders via a Microsoft Defender zero-day (CVE-2024-21412). These invisible blades cut quick and quiet—by the time you saw the blood, the damage was done.

Cybercriminals are increasingly adopting tactics similar to state-sponsored actors, including the use of zero-day exploits.
In 2024 insider threat report, the number of disclosed zero-day vulnerabilities affecting edge devices significantly increased, with over a dozen having a CVSS risk score of eight or higher.
Both nation-state actors and ransomware groups exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in edge devices like Ivanti Connect Secure and Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS GlobalProtect as entry points.
Exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in edge devices has significant consequences because these devices are not easily patched due to their critical role in network flow.
In September 2024, an unknown threat actor chained a zero-day file disclosure vulnerability (CVE-2024-21287) with a known deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2024-20953) to compromise devices.
Threat actors are expected to continue aggressively targeting devices at the network periphery, particularly network appliances, and will likely operationalize public Proof-of-Concept (POC) exploits faster than in previous years.
China-nexus actors are expected to continue exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities due to their national-scale vulnerability collection.
Trend Micro identified a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2024-38112) exploited by Void Banshee targeting Windows users.
Water Hydra targeted traders with a Microsoft Defender SmartScreen zero-day exploit (CVE-2024-21412).

Threat Actors Targeting These Risks: The Rogues’ Legion

The city faced a rogue’s legion in 2024. Cybercriminals cooked up slick new tricks, chaining phishing, BEC, and ransomware into deadly combos. Nation-states—China, Russia, Iran—played puppet masters, maybe with AI and LLMs, twisting minds and elections with disinformation. Dark Angels bagged $75 million, ALPHV nabbed $22 million from Change Healthcare, and infostealers ran wild, snatching creds for fraud and break-ins. China-nexus attacks spiked 150%, with seven new crews joining the fray—CrowdStrike’s radar lit up. Russia eyed Ukraine and NATO, while eCrime leaned on vishing and help-desk scams.

LockBit led the ransomware pack, with Akira and Black Basta trailing, and RansomHub roared onto the scene. The U.S. government braced for 2025 hits from China, Russia, and Iran, exploiting admin shifts. Hacktivists scoped OT/ICS for chaos, and FAMOUS CHOLLIMA turned insiders into spies, faking software gigs to swipe IP. This wasn’t one villain—it was a horde, tearing at every seam.

Cybercriminals devise new and sophisticated ways to attack people and breach organizations.
Threat actors often encounter phishing, business email compromise (BEC), and ransomware as individual components of extended attack chains.
Nation-states like China, Russia, and Iran used advanced tactics, potentially involving AI and large language models (LLMs), to manipulate public opinion, undermine trust, and interfere with elections through disinformation campaigns.
The ransomware group Dark Angels reportedly secured a $75 million payment, and ALPHV extracted $22 million from Change Healthcare.
Infostealers have become a significant and wide-scale threat, offering efficient ways to steal credentials and session tokens for financial fraud, identity theft, and corporate network entry.
China-nexus intrusions increased by 150% on average across all sectors compared to 2023, representing the most active targeted intrusion threats; CrowdStrike identified seven new specialized China-nexus adversaries in 2024.
Russia-nexus adversaries are expected to continue focusing on intelligence collection operations targeting Ukraine and NATO members.
eCrime adversaries relied more heavily on vishing, callback phishing, and help desk attacks for initial network access.
The most prevalent ransomware family in incident response cases in 2024 was LockBit, followed by Akira and Black Basta.
RansomHub emerged as a prominent ransomware threat.
China, Russia, and Iran will continue targeting the U.S. government into 2025, likely taking advantage of administration changes.
Hacktivists demonstrated growing awareness of OT/ICS environments as potential attack vectors.
Espionage and Data Theft: Nation-state actors, like the FAMOUS CHOLLIMA group, recruit insiders for espionage, seeking intellectual property or sensitive data; FAMOUS CHOLLIMA operatives used stolen or fraudulent identities to secure software development jobs, often for salary but potentially for data exfiltration.

Major Incidents in 2024 the Cost of Insider Threats: The Big Busts

The city reeled from 2024’s heist spree. PyPI’s typosquatting dropped 500+ poison packages, primed for PII grabs and malware. Change Healthcare bled $872 million in Q1, losing 100 million records to ransomware chaos. Snowflake got stung—165 orgs hit via infostealer creds, with data snatched and ransoms demanded. Ivanti and Palo Alto PAN-OS zero-days got mauled by spies and gangs, while a Citrix misconfig handed over the keys. Palo Alto and Cisco IOS chains kept defenders dizzy, and Microsoft 365 took slicker hits. Healthcare drowned in double-extortion ransomware, and GenAI faked IT job candidates for sneaky wins. It was a blockbuster of busts, leaving the city gasping.

A typosquatting campaign deployed over 500 malicious packages on PyPI, posing risks of PII theft and malware installation.
The ransomware attack on Change Healthcare resulted in months of disrupted service and over 100 million patients’ medical records stolen, with a reported $872 million impact in Q1 2024 for UnitedHealth.
Attackers targeted Snowflake, a cloud data warehousing platform, using credentials obtained through infostealers, accessing accounts of at least 165 companies, exfiltrating data, and issuing extortion demands.
High-severity vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS GlobalProtect were exploited by both nation-state actors and ransomware groups.
A misconfigured Citrix appliance was exploited, enabling attackers to bypass authentication and gain administrative control over a network.
Exploit chains targeting Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software and Cisco IOS vulnerabilities were observed.
Attacks on Microsoft 365 environments became more prevalent and sophisticated.
Ransomware attacks continued to plague organizations globally, with threat actors frequently using double extortion; healthcare was particularly hard hit.
GenAI played a role in sophisticated cyberattack campaigns, including the creation of fake IT job candidates.

Other Existing Attack Vectors: The Sneaky Strikes

Beyond the big guns, 2024 insider threat report saw sneakier plays. Legit tools—PowerShell, RMM—turned into LOLBins, letting crooks hide in plain sight. Cloud attacks pounced on misconfigs and APIs, with LLMjacking eyeing cloud-hosted models as fresh prey. ORBs flipped edge devices into shadow hubs, masking moves for cybercrooks and spies. Drive-by hits rigged websites to zap visitors with malware, no clicks needed. USB drops lured the curious with infected bait, while social media spun phishing and recon webs. Typosquatting tricked devs with fake packages on repositories—a quiet sting with big bite. These side hustles kept the city on its toes.

Abuse of Legitimate Tools (Living off the Land – LOLBins): Attackers leverage built-in OS tools and legitimate software (e.g., PowerShell, RMM software) for malicious purposes, blending with normal activity to evade detection.
Cloud-Specific Attacks: Attackers target cloud infrastructure via misconfigurations, weak access controls, compromised service accounts, and cloud service API exploitation (e.g., Microsoft Graph API); LLMjacking, compromising Large Language Models in the cloud, emerges as a new threat.
Operational Relay Boxes (ORBs): Cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors exploit edge devices to set up ORBs for anonymization, obscuring activities and maintaining persistence.
Drive-by Compromise: Attackers compromise websites to automatically install malware on visitors’ systems without interaction.
USB Drops: Infected USB drives left in target locations remain a potential, though less common, attack vector.
Social Media: Platforms are used for phishing, malware distribution, and reconnaissance.
Typosquatting: Attackers deploy malicious packages with names mimicking legitimate ones on software repositories to deceive developers.

Mitigating Insider Threats: A Comprehensive Approach with NodeZero and Warden

Insider threats—whether from malicious employees, compromised accounts, or unintentional errors—pose a significant risk to organizations. Mitigating them requires a multi-faceted strategy that blends technical controls, employee awareness, and robust policies to address insider threat management, insider risk management and insider threat programs. By incorporating NodeZero’s continuous pentesting and Warden’s kernel-level protection, organizations can enhance their defenses against these threats. Below are the updated mitigation strategies to reduce the chances of an insider incident, followed by a summary of effective insider threat management actionable steps prioritizing these solutions.

1. Implement Strong Access Controls and the Principle of Least Privilege

Restrict domain account permissions and harden administrator accounts with stringent help-desk procedures for recovery and resets.
Apply secure configurations to firewalls, load balancers, and cloud gateways.
Enforce strict access controls for externally facing devices.
Utilize endpoint segmentation by blocking SMB communication from workstations to unnecessary servers.
Restrict access to critical systems with zero-trust authentication measures for clients and internal users. Regularly review trust assumptions.
Implement least-privilege policies for cloud environments and SaaS applications, with periodic permission audits.
Audit access to secrets in password managers, storing credentials in MFA-enabled encrypted stores.
Restrict personal device use for employer portals to prevent credential theft from infected devices.
Configure devices with Zero Trust and least privilege principles.
Leverage Warden’s kernel-level protection: Warden enforces least privilege at the system level using its zero-trust architecture and kernel API virtualization. This prevents insiders from exploiting system vulnerabilities to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access, even if they have legitimate credentials.

2. Enhance Monitoring and Detection Capabilities

Leverage SIEM solutions and threat intelligence feeds to detect anomalous activity.
Implement user behavior-based monitoring to flag compromised accounts or insider threats.
Track and resolve security control bottlenecks.
Monitor for rules with keywords like “payroll,” “malware,” or “virus.”
Monitor cloud environments and SaaS applications for threats.
Proactively detect potential network access sales as early warnings of insider compromises.
Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions for early threat identification and isolation.
Enhance logging with robust logs and SIEM to identify anomalies across environments, ensuring coverage for critical assets.
Watch for exploit chaining signs, like unexpected crashes or privilege escalation attempts.
Use identity threat detection tools to monitor behavior across endpoints, on-premises, cloud, and SaaS, flagging unauthorized access or backdoors.
Perform network micro-segmentation to minimize the attack surface for APTs.
Utilize NodeZero’s continuous pentesting: Cybersecurity insiders know the value of pentesting. With NodeZero’s AI-driven pentesting you are now able to proactively identify and prioritize vulnerabilities that insiders could exploit. Its real-time anomaly detection and suspicious behavior analysis enhance monitoring, complementing SIEM and EDR by exposing risks before they’re exploited.

3. Implement Robust Credential Management

Enforce strong, unique passwords for all accounts, including local and service accounts, with complexity requirements.
Implement MFA across all systems, prioritizing phishing-resistant options like passkeys and security keys for critical accounts.
Rotate potentially compromised credentials promptly.
Disable unused or default accounts (e.g., Windows Administrator) and monitor compliance.
Provide password managers for secure storage, preventing browser password saving via Group Policy.

4. Enhance Employee Training and Awareness

Conduct regular training on phishing, social engineering, and credential hygiene.
Train users to recognize phishing keywords and report suspicious emails, using internal scenarios for practice.
Educate staff on securing edge systems and reporting abnormal payroll activity.
Prioritize social engineering training for IT help-desk roles with robust programs and clear procedures.
Teach employees about GenAI’s role in crafting convincing attacks, reinforced by simulations.
Encourage immediate reporting of unusual activity to security teams.
Use NodeZero’s Tripwires: This feature simulates insider threat scenarios, educating employees on malicious tactics and improving their ability to recognize and report insider risks.

5. Implement Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Measures

Deploy DLP solutions to monitor and block real-time data exfiltration, with alerts for unusual access or bulk movement.
Encrypt data at rest and in transit.
Leverage Warden’s kernel-level protection: Warden prevents insiders from exploiting system vulnerabilities to exfiltrate data, ensuring that even privileged users can’t bypass DLP controls at the kernel level.

6. Establish and Regularly Review Security Policies and Procedures

Audit and control administrative account usage with usage profiles for admin tools.
Set stricter controls on AI tools within systems.
Apply conditional access policies for contractors, limiting session durations and enforcing restrictions.
Develop and test incident response plans tailored to insider threats.
Ensure playbooks address edge-based threats.
Create a breach notification plan for external parties.
Use NodeZero’s continuous pentesting insights: NodeZero’s real-time vulnerability data informs policy updates, ensuring they address current insider threat risks.

7. Other Important Considerations

Audit system configurations, startup items, and scheduled tasks for persistence mechanisms.
Apply application whitelisting to block unauthorized executables at startup.
Deploy File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) to detect unauthorized changes to critical files.
Conduct red team exercises and vulnerability assessments to simulate attacks and improve defenses.
Foster a security-conscious culture where employees protect organizational assets.
Perform background checks on privileged role hires (a common best practice).
Implement separation of duties to limit individual control over critical processes.
Combine NodeZero and Warden: NodeZero’s continuous pentesting identifies vulnerabilities, while Warden’s kernel-level protection prevents their exploitation, creating a comprehensive insider threat defense.

Mitigating Insider Threat Risks Summary

Mitigating insider threats requires a layered approach combining technical controls, employee education, and robust policies to detect and prevent insider threats. Warden’s kernel-level protection hardens systems against exploitation by enforcing least privilege and preventing insiders from abusing vulnerabilities. NodeZero’s continuous pentesting proactively identifies and prioritizes risks with AI-driven insights, enhancing detection and awareness. Together, these solutions strengthen access controls, monitoring, and DLP, reducing both human and technical risks. Acting as if you’re already targeted, organizations can significantly lower their insider threat exposure.

Mitigation Actionable Steps

Implement Kernel-Level Defense with Warden: Deploy Warden to protect systems at the kernel level, enforcing zero-trust and preventing insiders from exploiting vulnerabilities for unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
Conduct Continuous Pentesting with NodeZero: Use NodeZero’s AI-driven pentesting to prioritize vulnerabilities and detect insider threat risks in real time, integrating its Tripwires for employee training.
Enforce Strong Access Controls: Apply least privilege and zero-trust principles across all systems, enhanced by Warden’s system-level enforcement.
Enhance Monitoring: Combine SIEM, EDR, and NodeZero’s anomaly detection for comprehensive threat visibility.
Educate Employees: Train staff on insider threat tactics, using NodeZero’s simulations to reinforce awareness.
Secure Credentials: Mandate MFA and robust password policies.
Prevent Data Loss: Use DLP solutions, bolstered by Warden’s kernel-level safeguards.

Predictions for 2025 Based on Insider Threat Trends: The Next Storm

The horizon darkened for 2025—a tempest brewed. Cyber tricks will outfox weak defenses, with ransomware surging past 2024—RansomHub early, BlackLock by Q3, and new gangs popping up. IABs will keep hawking third-party access, while GenAI sharpens social engineering, disinformation, and vuln hunting, lowering the bar for rookies. Phishing-as-a-service will roll out MFA-busting tricks, and cloud platforms will lean on AI—think CNAPP, DSPM—to fight back. EOL products will stay soft targets, and cyber democratization will arm novices. China, Russia, Iran will chase geopolitical wins, with China upping its stealth game. Infostealers will unlock big breaches, NIS2 will toughen EMEA rules, and quantum risks will loom. The city’s gearing up—patch, lock, and watch, or get washed away.

Cyber threats are expected to continue outpacing and outsmarting traditional or poorly implemented security controls.
Ransomware attacks are predicted to surge throughout 2025, surpassing 2024 levels; RansomHub is expected to be a major threat early in the year, with BlackLock potentially taking the lead by Q3; new ransomware collectives are likely to emerge.
Initial Access Brokers (IABs) are very likely to remain a significant threat, potentially focusing more on monetizing access to third-party providers.
GenAI will likely be increasingly used by threat actors to augment and optimize existing tactics, particularly in social engineering, disinformation, vulnerability research, and code development; less skilled actors will have lower barriers to entry.
Social engineering is expected to remain a common attack vector, with phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) underpinning a significant portion of phishing activity, featuring increasingly sophisticated capabilities like MFA bypass.
Cloud-based platforms are increasingly serving as the foundation for cybersecurity, with AI-driven integration becoming more effective; solutions like CNAPP, ASPM, and DSPM are merging.
Exploitation of end-of-life (EOL) products is almost certain to continue or grow.
Organizations will continue to be challenged by the democratization of cyber capabilities, lowering barriers for less-skilled actors.
China, Russia, and Iran will continue their cyber activities, pursuing geopolitical goals; China-nexus actors will likely increase their OPSEC practices and maintain a high operational tempo.
Infostealer malware is expected to remain a rising threat and a gateway to high-impact data breaches.
NIS2 will significantly reshape cybersecurity practices across EMEA, introducing stricter requirements and expanding its scope.
Organizations need to start understanding and planning for the risks posed by quantum computing.
Organizations should prioritize proactive and comprehensive cybersecurity, including cloud-native security, robust identity and access management, and continuous threat intelligence.

The Scars from Insider Attacks and the Stand Against Insider Risks for 2025

As 2024 insider threat report dust settled, the digital city stood scarred but steely-eyed. Insiders—40% of intrusions—sold out, some lured by cash, others faking IT gigs to swipe IP, leaving backdoors and chaos. Edge defenses crumbled—84,000 alerts, half from EOL servers, with Ivanti and Citrix breaches opening corporate gates. Third-party traps snared supply chains, IABs turning vendors into dominoes, while zero-days—over a dozen CVSS 8+—hit fast, chaining flaws like CVE-2024-21287 to Void Banshee’s sting. Threat actors ruled—China’s 150% surge, ALPHV’s $22M Change Healthcare grab, LockBit’s reign—mixing phishing, vishing, and GenAI fakery.

Snowflake’s 165 orgs and PyPI’s 500+ fakes marked the year’s big busts, with healthcare reeling from double extortion. Sneaky strikes—LOLBins, ORBs, social media cons—slipped through cracks, and a Cloudflare DDoS roared from hacked routers. Now, 2025 looms—ransomware will surge with RansomHub and BlackLock, GenAI will sharpen phishing, and cloud platforms will fight back with AI. IABs, EOL gear, and NIS2 rules will shape the battlefield, but hope flickers—patch fast, watch sharp, and stand tall. The city’s bruised, but it’s learning to brawl.

Key Takeaways from 2024 Insider Risk:

Insider Betrayal: 40% of intrusions tied to insiders, some recruited for cash or espionage—secure identities and track behavior.
Edge Exposure: Over 84,000 alerts hit edge devices, 60% from 2024 vulns—patch fast or lose the perimeter.
Third-Party Tangles: IABs exploited weak vendors, hitting supply chains—monitor third- and fourth-party risks relentlessly.
Zero-Day Zaps: Over a dozen CVSS 8+ zero-days struck Ivanti and Palo Alto—harden edges against silent strikes.
Threat Actor Throngs: China’s 150% spike, Dark Angels’ $75M, ALPHV’s $22M—brace for nation-states and eCrime combos.
Phishing Persistence: Vishing and help-desk tricks fueled breaches—train staff and block MFA bypasses.
Ransomware Rage: LockBit led, RansomHub rose, hitting healthcare hard—back up and segment to survive 2025’s surge.
Big Busts: Snowflake’s 165 orgs, Change Healthcare’s 100M records, $872M loss—every weak spot’s a jackpot.
Sneaky Vectors: LOLBins, ORBs, and typosquatting (500+ PyPI fakes) slipped in—watch tools and trust nothing.
Cloud Clash: Misconfigs and API hits bred LLMjacking—lock down cloud access and configs.
2025 Forecast: GenAI phishing, IABs, and EOL risks loom, but cloud-AI and NIS2 offer fight—stay proactive or sink.

; 2024 Insider Threat, 2024 Insider Threat Report, 2025 Insider Threat Predictions, Cybersecurity